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Abstract Various optimizations in the Canetti–Krawczyk model for secure protocol design are proven to
preserve security. In particular it is shown that multiple authenticators may be safely used together; that
certain message components generated by authenticators may be reordered (to be sent at a different time)
or replaced with other values with certain precautions; and that protocols may be defined in the ideal world
with session identifiers constructed during protocol runs. Consequently protocol designers now have a set
of clear rules to optimize and customize their designs without fear of breaking the security proof. In order
to obtain the required proofs, we find it necessary to slightly revise the authenticated links part of the
Canetti–Krawczyk model.
1 Introduction
The computational approach to proofs of protocols for key establishment was pioneered by Bellare and
Rogaway [5,2] and later extended to several other protocols in different scenarios by themselves and others
[6,4,8,9]. Using indistinguishability, a familiar notion in cryptography, as the basis of their security definition,
they showed that if an adversary can be successful then there must be an efficient way to break at least one
of the underlying cryptographic algorithms. Proofs in this model are monolithic; they also tend to be long
and complex thereby providing obstacles to practitioners who want to understand what may happen if a
small change is made to the protocol.
In 1998 Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [3] introduced the idea of a modular approach to protocol proofs.
Although the general structure of the model was quite similar to the earlier Bellare–Rogaway model the
security definition used a simulatability approach rather than the earlier indistinguishability approach. Un-
fortunately it turned out that the simulatability definition for security was too strong to be practical, since
many natural protocols that seem to be secure do not satisfy it. Therefore Canetti and Krawczyk recast
that model a little later [11] with a new security definition based on indistinguishability. The new version
retained the modular approach of the earlier paper by defining authenticators that can be used to transform
protocols secure in an ideal world into protocols secure in the real world. We will refer to this new version as
the CK approach throughout this paper. An authenticator can be regarded as a compiler that takes protocol
messages from the world of ideal “magically authenticated” messages to the real world.
The CK approach forms the basis for reuse of protocol proofs since it is possible to match any protocol in
the ideal world with any authenticator in order to form new proven secure protocols. The papers of Bellare,
Canetti and Krawczyk [3,11] provided only a basic set of these building blocks. They showed how these may
be used to prove the security of a small number of protocols, but did not produce any new designs. Recently
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a number of additional building blocks have been provided. Because multiple new protocols result from each
new component, this means that a large number of proven secure protocols can already be derived this way.
Most of the authenticators that exist today are built from a special kind of basic authenticator that
can be applied to a single message in the ideal world independently of any other message. These so-called
message transmission (mt-) authenticators transform one ideal-world message into multiple (typically three)
real-world messages. This means that na¨ıve application of the method to a protocol with multiple messages
in the ideal world leads to a very inefficient protocol. For this reason real-world messages need to be reordered
and combined if a protocol with acceptable efficiency is to be obtained. This process may include omission
of certain elements and reuse (or overloading) of elements to take multiple roles. For example, nonces may
often be replaced by other protocol values as long as they are known to be fresh. Use of mt-authenticators
also allows a richer set of real-world protocols when different ideal-world messages are authenticated using
different mt-authenticators.
An important element in the CK approach is the use of session identifiers (SIDs) which are used to
ensure that messages are used in only one session. In the abstract model it is assumed that a unique SID is
assigned and available to both participating parties before each protocol run commences. This is unrealistic
in practice and so SIDs used in practical designs are typically formed from the combination of randomly
chosen inputs from each participant.
Put together there are four types of protocol optimization that we have discussed:
1. mixing of different authenticators in the same protocol;
2. reordering of messages in real world protocols;
3. omission and re-use of certain protocol elements;
4. formation of SIDs from information exchanged during the protocol run.
The last three of these were suggested and illustrated in the original papers on the CK approach [3,11] while
the first one is very useful in extending the range of proven secure protocols that can be achieved. However,
although there are heuristic arguments for why these actions are reasonable, up to now there has been no
formal argument that these optimizations do not break the security proofs. This is not a very satisfactory
situation since it means that in order to end up with a practical protocol with a claimed rigorous security
proof, we need to take some steps without any guarantee that the proof remains valid. The purpose of this
paper is to remedy this situation. In particular the contributions of this paper are:
– formal proofs of the first three optimization steps listed above provided certain conditions are met;
– extension of the model to realize these optimizations, and to enable session identifiers to be chosen after
the protocol run has begun;
– illustration of how the resulting mechanical rules can be used to obtain practical protocols with fully
rigorous security proofs.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents background on the CK approach
sufficient to explain its use in the rest of the paper. This includes a list of the currently available ideal-world
protocols and mt-authenticators. Section 3 describes how to alter the existing real world model in order to
properly reorder messages and choose session identifiers after the protocol has begun. Section 4 proves that
multiple authenticators may be used together in one protocol. The remaining optimizations are described in
Section 5, namely omitting and moving various authenticator elements, and reusing values as nonces. We use
a running example to illustrate use of the optimization rules, which applies two authenticators to the two
messages of the standard ephemeral Diffie–Hellman protocol; one message is authenticated using a signature,
and the other using encryption.
2 The Canetti–Krawczyk Model
In this section the CK approach is reviewed. Further details of the model can be found in the original
papers [3,11].
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2.1 Key Establishment Protocols
In the CK model a protocol pi is modeled as a collection of n programs running at different parties P1, . . . , Pn.
Each program is an interactive probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) machine. Each invocation of pi within a
party is defined as a session, and each party may have multiple sessions running concurrently. The commu-
nications network is controlled by an adversary A, also a PPT machine, which schedules and mediates all
sessions between the parties. When first invoked within a party, a key exchange protocol pi calls an initializa-
tion function that returns any information needed for the bootstrapping of the cryptographic authentication
functions (e.g. private keys and authentic distribution of other parties’ public keys). After this initialization
stage, the party waits for activation. A may activate a party Pi in two ways:
1. by means of an establish-session(Pi, Pj , s, role) request, where Pj is another party with whom the key is
to be established, s is a session-id string which uniquely identifies a session between the participants,
and role ∈ {initiator, responder}. Note that the session-id is chosen by the adversary, with the restriction
that it must be unique among all sessions between the two parties involved. This allows the delivery of
messages to the right protocol instantiation within a party.
2. by means of an incoming message m with a specified sender Pj .
A restriction exists on how the adversary activates parties, depending on which of the following two
adversarial models is being considered.
– The authenticated-links model (AM) defines an idealized adversary that is restricted to delivering mes-
sages faithfully between uncorrupted parties, if at all. That is, the adversary may only deliver messages
where the specified (uncorrupted) sender actually sent that message to the specified recipient. The AM–
adversary is not allowed to fabricate, modify, or replay messages of its choice except if the message
is purported to come from a corrupted party. However, the adversary may decide not to deliver some
messages from uncorrupted parties at all, or to deliver messages out of order.
– The unauthenticated-links adversarial Model (UM) is a more realistic model in which the adversary does
not have the above restriction. Thus, a UM–adversary can fabricate messages and deliver any messages
of its choice.
Upon activation, the parties perform some computations, update their internal state, and may output
messages together with the identities of the intended receivers. Sessions may also add special messages to a
local output to record the occurrence of important, security-related events. For example, when the run of
a session finishes, a special key establishment event (Pi, Pj , s, κ) is recorded in the local output, to denote
that a key κ has been established with party Pj . κ = null denotes that the session has been aborted.
When κ 6= null the session is said to be completed. The adversary’s view consists of all parties’ public
authentication information, output messages and local outputs, except for the established keys (κ-values)
of completed sessions. Two sessions (Pi, Pj , s, role) and (P ′i , P
′
j , s
′, role ′) are said to be matching sessions if
Pi = P ′j , Pj = P
′
i , and s = s
′, i.e. if their session-ids are identical and they recognised each other as their
respective communicating partner for the session.
In addition to the activation of parties, A can perform the following queries:
1. corrupt(Pi). With this query A learns the entire current state of Pi including long-term secrets, session
internal states and session keys. From this point on, A may issue any message in which Pi is specified
as the sender and play the role of Pi. Whenever A corrupts a party, the event is recorded in the local
output of that party, and that party is never activated again;
2. session-key(Pi, Pj , s). This query returns the session key (if any) accepted by Pi during a given session s
with Pj . This event is recorded in the local output of that party;
3. session-state(Pi, Pj , s). This query returns all the internal state information of party Pi associated to a
particular session s with Pj . This event is recorded in the local output of that party and is sometimes
known as session corruption (as opposed to party corruption above);
4. session-expiration(Pi, Pj , s). This query can only be performed on a completed session. It is used for
defining forward secrecy and ensures that the corresponding session key is erased from the party’s memory.
The session is thereafter said to be expired. This event is recorded in the local output of that party;
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5. test-session(Pi, Pj , s). To respond to this query, a random bit b is selected. If b = 1 then the session key is
output. Otherwise, a random key is output chosen from the probability distribution of keys generated by
the protocol. This query can only be issued to a session that has not been exposed. A session is exposed
if the adversary performs any of the following actions:
– a session-state or session-key query to this session or to the matching session, or
– a corrupt query to either partner before the session expires at that partner.
2.2 Definition of security
Security is defined based on a game played by the adversary. In this game A interacts with the protocol. In
a first phase of the game, A is allowed to activate sessions and perform corrupt, session-key, session-state and
session-expiration queries as described above. The adversary then performs a test-session query to a party
and session of its choice. The adversary is not allowed to expose the test-session. A may then continue with
its regular actions with the exception that no more test-session queries can be issued. Eventually, A outputs
a bit b′ as its guess on whether the returned value to the test-session query was the session key or a random
value, then halts. A wins the game if b = b′. The definition of security follows.
Definition 1 A key establishment protocol pi is called session key (SK-) secure with perfect forward secrecy
(PFS) in the UM (resp. AM) if the following properties are satisfied for any UM (resp. AM) adversary A.
1. If two uncorrupted parties complete matching sessions then they both output the same key;
2. The probability that A guesses correctly the bit b is no more than 12 plus a negligible function in the
security parameter.
We define the advantage of A to be twice the probability that A wins, minus one. Hence the second re-
quirement will be met if the advantage of A is negligible. Canetti and Krawczyk also provide a definition of
SK-security without PFS. The only difference with respect to the above definition is that now the adversary
is not allowed to expire sessions.
Protocol 1 shows the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol, which was proven SK-secure with PFS in the AM by
Canetti and Krawcyzk [11]. The protocol assumes that primes p and q are known to each party before the
protocol begins, where q is of length k bits (where k is a security parameter), q divides p−1 and g is of order
q in Z∗p. Exponentiations are performed modulo p. This example will be used repeatedly later in this paper.
Shared Information: Parameters p, q, g, k.
A B
Input: (A,B, s)
rA ∈R Zq
tA = g
rA
A, s, tA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ rB ∈R Zq
tB = g
rB
KAB = t
rA
B
B, s, tB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− KBA = trBA
Erase rA Erase rB
‘Established (A,B, s,KAB)’ ‘Established (B,A, s,KBA)’
Protocol 1. Basic Diffie-Hellman protocol
2.3 Authenticators
By distinguishing between the AM and the UM, Canetti and Krawczyk allow for a modular approach to
the design of SK-secure protocols. Protocols that are SK-secure in the AM can be converted into SK-secure
protocols in the UM by applying an authenticator to them. An authenticator is a compiler C that takes as
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input a protocol pi and outputs another protocol pi′ = C(pi), with the property that if pi is SK-secure in the
AM, then pi′ is SK-secure in the UM. Authenticators are in fact defined to achieve the stronger notion of
protocol emulation. The authenticated protocol pi′ emulates protocol pi in the UM, which informally means
that whatever a UM adversary can do against pi′ can be done by an AM adversary against pi. More formally,
let U be an UM adversary interacting with protocol pi′, and let UNAUTHpi′,U denote the concatenation of the
cumulative local output of all parties running pi′ and the output of U . Similarly, let A be an AM adversary
interacting with protocol pi, and AUTHpi,A the concatenation of the cumulative local output of all parties
running pi and the output of A.
Definition 2 (Protocol Emulation) Protocol pi′ emulates protocol pi in the UM if for any UM adversary U
there exists an AM adversary A such that UNAUTHpi′,U and AUTHpi,A are computationally indistinguishable.
Definition 3 (Authenticator) An authenticator is a compiler C that given a protocol pi outputs a protocol
pi′ = C(pi) such that pi′ emulates pi in the UM.
Authenticators can be constructed from message transmission authenticators. An mt-authenticator is a
protocol that enables delivery of messages in the UM in an authenticated manner. However, each message
is authenticated almost independently of all other messages. (Although the same long term keys may often
be used by an authenticator to authenticate many messages, other data used by the authenticator such as a
nonce or signature is generated separately for each message to be authenticated.) To translate an SK-secure
protocol in the AM to an SK-secure protocol in the UM an mt-authenticator can be applied to each message
and the resultant sub-protocols combined to form one overall SK-secure protocol in the UM. In order to
define the security of an mt-authenticator, it is necessary to define the mt-protocol in the AM as follows.
Definition 4 (MT-Protocol) The mt-protocol in the AM has the following properties:
– upon activation within party A on external request (B,m), party A sends the message (A,B,m) to party
B and outputs ‘A sent m to B.’
– upon receipt of a message (A,B,m), B outputs ‘B received m from A.’
Definition 5 (MT-Authenticator) An mt-authenticator is a protocol that emulates the mt-protocol in
the UM.
We note that a protocol having no output is in fact a secure authenticator, because there exists an AM
adversary (which delivers no messages) with computationally indistinguishable output to the authenticator.
However, such an authenticator is trivial and of no practical use. Some authors have introduced non-triviality
requirements to eliminate such useless protocols [10, Section 6], [12, Section 3.1.1], [1]. However, no such
requirement currently exists in the CK model. Indeed, we consider that since trivial authenticators are
unlikely to be examined by users of the model, such a requirement is of limited practical value.
Figures 1 and 2 show two mt-authenticators proposed by Bellare et al. [3]. They authenticate the sending
of a message m from party A to party B. In the first one, party A signs the message together with a random
challenge sent by B and B’s identity. In the second one, B encrypts a random challenge using A’s public
key. A then uses the random challenge as the key in a message authentication code (MAC) of the message
and the recipient’s identity. Note that in both mt-authenticators m is sent in all protocol exchanges.
Let λ be an mt-authenticator and let Cλ be a compiler that on input a protocol pi outputs another
protocol pi′, which is identical to pi except that all outgoing and incoming messages are processed through
λ. Thus, whenever pi specifies sending a message m to a party, λ is activated to send the same message to
the same party. Whenever pi′ is activated on an incoming message, the message is handed to λ.
Theorem 1 ([3]) Cλ as described above is an authenticator.
Finally, we state the result that allows us to turn SK-secure protocols in the AM into SK-secure protocols
in the UM by application of authenticators.
Theorem 2 ([11]) Let protocol pi be SK-secure in the AM, and let C be an authenticator. Then, the protocol
pi′ = C(pi) is SK-secure in the UM.
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A B
Choose message m
‘A sent m to B’
m−−−−−−−−−−→
m,NB←−−−−−−−−−− NB ∈R {0, 1}k
σ = SigA(m,B,NB)
m,σ−−−−−−−−−−→
Check σ = SigA(m,B,NB);
if not then abort.
‘B received m from A’
Fig. 1 Signature-based mt-authenticator [3]
A B
Choose message m
‘A sent m to B’
m−−−−−−−−−−→ NB ∈R {0, 1}k
c = EPKA(NB)
c = DSKA(c)
m, c←−−−−−−−−−−
µ = MACNB (m,B)
m,µ−−−−−−−−−−→
Check µ = MACNB (m,B);
if not then abort.
‘B received m from A’
Fig. 2 Encryption-based mt-authenticator [3]
Protocol 2 shows the result of the direct application of a compiler built from the signature authenticator
of Figure 1 to the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol (Protocol 1). As noted just after the proof of Theorem 4
later in this paper, the identity of the sender of each message included in each message in Protocol 1 is
not necessary to the security of the protocol, and was omitted before applying the authenticator to produce
Protocol 2. (It is assumed that if they are necessary for practical purposes, the identity of sender and recipient
are provided automatically, for example in a header field of the message.) The new protocol, which by virtue
of Theorem 2 is SK-secure in the UM, consists of 6 message flows. This increase of message exchanges is
clearly unsatisfactory. Canetti and Krawczyk [11] argued that Protocol 2 can be turned into a three-pass
protocol (Protocol 3) by:
– sending message 5 at the same time as message 1 but omitting tB ,
– sending messages 4 and 6 together with message 2, and
– setting NA = tA and NB = tB .
However, the arguments given for such optimization steps were heuristic. (The inclusion of the identity of the
sender in each message has been retained from Canetti and Krawczyk’s original description in Protocol 3.)
As we show in subsequent sections, the formal justification of the optimization steps is not trivial, and we
have only achieved it by modifying the underlying model.
2.4 A Library of Building Blocks
Table 1 summarizes the existing AM protocols and mt-authenticators that can be used as building blocks in
the CK model. We give a descriptive name for each, as well as indicating the computational assumption on
which it depends. The first two authenticators listed were proposed and proven secure in the original paper
defining the modular approach [3] while the first two AM protocols as well as the third authenticator listed
come from the later paper of Canetti and Krawczyk [11]. The remaining components have been proposed
and proven secure in different papers published recently [15,16,13,7].
In principle, every AM protocol in the table can be used with every authenticator. Moreover, when the
AM protocol has two messages, each of these messages can use a different authenticator, as we shall show in
Section 4. This is the case for Diffie-Hellman and server-based key transport (the other AM protocols shown
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A B
rA ∈R Zq
tA = g
rA
‘A sent (s, tA) to B’
s, tA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ NB ∈R {0, 1}k
σA = Sig(s, tA, B,NB)
s, tA, NB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
s, tA, σA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check σA = SigA(s, tA, B,NB);
if not then abort.
‘B received (s, tA) from A’
rB ∈R Zq
tB = g
rB
s, tB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ‘B sent (s, tB) to A’
NA ∈R {0, 1}k s, tB , NA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ σB = Sig(s, tB , A,NA)
s, tB , σB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check σB = SigB(s, tB , A,NA);
if not then abort.
‘A received (s, tB) from A’
KAB = t
rA
B KBA = t
rB
A
Erase rA Erase rB
‘Established (A,B, s,KAB))’ ‘Established (B,A, s,KBA)’
Protocol 2. Unoptimized Diffie-Hellman protocol in the UM (one mt-authenticator)
A B
Input: (A,B, s)
rA ∈R Zq
tA = g
rA
A, s, tA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ rB ∈R Zq
tB = g
rB
KBA = t
rB
A
Erase rB
Check σB = SigB(B, s, tB , tA, A);
if not then abort.
B, s, tB , σB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− σB = SigB(B, s, tB , tA, A)
KAB = t
rA
B
Erase rA
‘Established (A,B, s,KAB)’
σA = SigA(A, s, tA, tB , B)
A, s, σA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check σA = SigA(A, s, tA, tB , B);
if not then abort.
‘Established (B,A, s,KBA)’
Protocol 3. Original optimized Diffie-Hellman protocol using signatures for authentication
have only one message). This means that in total there are 60 proven secure protocols that can be derived
from the components in Table 1. Not all of these protocols may be of practical significance but a great many
of them correspond closely to published protocols in the literature. For example, Bellare and Rogaway’s
3PKD protocol [2] can be derived by applying the authenticator using MACs with existing shared keys to
the server-based key transport AM protocol. Another example is a standardised key agreement protocol [14]
that can be derived by applying the signature authenticator to the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol. In addition
to providing new proofs for existing protocols, the components have also been used to construct new proven
secure protocols [15,16,13,7].
8 Yvonne Hitchcock et al.
AM protocols Computational assumption
Diffie-Hellman DDH
Key transport CCA-secure encryption
ElGamal type Gap-DH
Server-based key transport CPA-secure encryption
Authenticators Computational assumption
Signature-based Secure signature
Encryption-based Secure MAC and CCA-secure encryption
MAC with existing shared key Secure MAC
Password-based CCA-secure encryption
Statically keyed CDH and random hash function
Table 1 Existing proven secure components
3 The Authenticated Links Model Revisited
This section explains a variation of the original AM definition, which is required in order to make the
subsequent optimizations formally valid. We first explain what can go wrong if the current AM definition is
used, and then explain the details of the revised model.
3.1 Potential Problems of Reordering AM Messages
Although Protocol 3 was constructed using the signature-based authenticator of Fig. 1, certain outputs that
the authenticator generates are omitted, such as the output ‘A sent A, s, tA to B’ by A, or the output ‘B
received A, s, tA from A’ by B. Outputs of this type are hereafter referred to as sent and received outputs.
Although these outputs do not appear to affect the security of the final key exchange protocol directly, they
are important for the analysis of the protocol’s security. Attempts to insert the sent and received outputs
into the optimized UM protocol reveal that they cannot occur in the same order as in the AM protocol. For
example, A’s output ‘A sent A, s, tA to B’ could be inserted before either the first or third protocol message.
If it is inserted before the first message, B must output ‘B sent B, s, tB to A’ before it outputs ‘B received
A, s, tA from A’, which is contrary to the AM protocol (since B must receive the message from A before
it sends its own message to A according to the AM protocol). If A’s output is inserted before the third
message, then tA becomes known to the adversary and to B in the UM before it would have become known
in the AM. Although this prior knowledge may not cause a problem for the Diffie-Hellman protocol, it is
conceivable that other protocols may exist where early release of a message (even though unauthenticated)
may compromise security. It is clear that the optimized Protocol 3 does not emulate Protocol 1 from the
AM due to the different order of the outputs.
In addition to the differences in placement of sent and received messages, there is another reason why
the optimized UM protocol does not emulate the AM protocol. In the original AM protocol, the responder
receives the initiator’s message, chooses its secret exponent, calculates and outputs the secret key, erases
the secret exponent and sends its Diffie-Hellman value to the initiator all in one activation. However, in the
optimized UM protocol, the responder does not output the secret key until it receives the initiator’s authentic
message in its second activation. A UM adversary that never delivers the second message to the responder
never enables the responder to output the initiator’s message or the secret key. Therefore emulation is not
achieved in the UM because there is no AM adversary that can force the responder in the AM protocol to
split its operations between two activations, instead of completing them together. Although the emulation
between AM and UM is broken in the above example, this does not imply that the UM key exchange
described by Canetti and Krawczyk is insecure. However, it would be quite feasible to destroy the security
of the UM protocol when splitting the activities from one activation in the AM into two activations in the
UM, for example by outputting the secret key before receiving the initiator’s authentic message. Although
it may seem obvious that this would break the security of the protocol, restrictions on other steps, such as
the erasure of the secret exponent are not so clear.
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There are two possible strategies for proving that optimized UM protocols are secure realizations of AM
protocols. One is to start with an AM protocol suitable for emulation by an optimized UM protocol. The
other is to prove that even though the UM protocol may not emulate the AM protocol, it still satisfies the
definition of SK-security. The latter approach seems attractive, but does not seem feasible unless a new proof
of security is generated for each optimized UM protocol. It seems impossible to prove a generic theorem to
enable AM protocol components to be moved during the optimization process in the UM. Furthermore, to
generate a new proof for each UM protocol defeats the main advantage of the CK-model, namely its modular
proof approach. Therefore, the option of starting with an AM protocol suitable for emulation by an optimized
UM protocol is now examined.
3.2 Formulating AM Protocols Suitable for Optimized Emulation
The two main problems raised in the example above are the splitting of steps carried out in one AM activation
across two UM activations, and the use of an AM value in the UM before it has been sent in the AM or
received authentically. A third problem is that it may be desired to use the protocol with s = (tA, tB).
However, this is not possible in the current formulation because s must be chosen before tA and tB are
chosen. To overcome the problem of using AM values in the UM before they have been sent in the AM, the
AM message could be shifted to an earlier position. However, this requires waiting for that AM message to
be sent authentically before carrying out further actions specified in the AM protocol. This is likely to cause
the resultant UM protocol to be non-optimal. The only other alternative is to specify in the AM protocol
that the AM message may be released at an earlier time than it is sent authentically. This could be done
in a number of ways, such as addressing the message to the AM adversary, A, instead of the other protocol
participant, and having A forward the message to the desired recipient. Another method would be to add the
value to the party’s local output where A can read it, and have A input the value to the other party. However,
the method with the most clarity seems to be to allow unauthentic messages in the AM. To avoid confusion,
we specify a new model, the hybrid model or HM, which captures this concept. HM protocols must indicate
which messages are authenticated, and which are not. Specifically, the HM adversary, H, can perform any
action originally allowed in the AM, and is still restricted to faithfully delivering authentic HM messages
at most once and to the specified recipient with the actual sender correctly specified (if the messages are
delivered at all). H may not deliver a fabricated or modified message as an authentic HM message. However,
H may fabricate any message of her choosing at any time and deliver it as an unauthentic message in the
HM to any recipient with any party specified as the sender. H may use any information at her disposal to
fabricate unauthentic HM messages, including the contents of previously sent authenticated HM messages
that may or may not have been delivered.
In addition, HM protocols may begin before being assigned a session identifier, and may specify at what
point a session identifier is to be assigned (by the adversary or the party running the protocol). In this case,
instead of the adversary inputting establish-session(Pi, Pj , s, role) to begin a session at party Pi to exchange
a secret key with party Pj with session identifier s and with Pi acting as an initiator if role = initiator or a
responder if role = responder, the value s may be replaced with φ to indicate no session identifier has yet been
chosen. The adversary may input the value of the session identifier at a later point in the protocol, or the
protocol may specify how the party running the protocol is to construct the session identifier. Any session that
has not yet been assigned a session identifier is not considered to have any matching session. However, once a
session identifier has been assigned, the definition of matching remains basically unchanged from the AM and
UM (i.e. two sessions (Pi, Pj , φ, role) and (P ′i , P
′
j , φ, role
′) match if they have been assigned the same session
identifier and Pi = P ′j and Pj = P
′
i ). As in the AM and UM, the adversary is restricted to choose a session
identifier for a session of a party that has never been used as a session identifier by another session of that
party. The corrupt, session-key, session-state, session-expiration and test-session queries remain unchanged,
as does the definition of exposure.
We observe that running a protocol pi′ that never sends any authentic messages in the HM and has a
session identifier assigned at the very beginning is equivalent to running the same protocol in the UM. Also,
running a protocol pi in the HM that never sends any unauthentic messages and has a session identifier
assigned at the very beginning with an adversary that never delivers any unauthentic messages is equivalent
to running the same protocol in the AM. When a protocol from the HM is converted to a UM protocol,
10 Yvonne Hitchcock et al.
authenticators need not be applied to unauthentic HM messages, only authentic ones. This is captured by
the following definitions and theorem.
Definition 6 (HM-emulation)
Let H be an HM adversary interacting with protocol pi, and let HYBRIDpi,H denote the concatenation of
the cumulative local output of all parties running pi and the output of H.
Protocol pi′ HM-emulates protocol pi in the HM if for any HM adversary U there exists an HM adversary
H such that HYBRIDpi,H and HYBRIDpi′,U are computationally indistinguishable.
Definition 7 (HM-Authenticator) An HM-authenticator is a compiler C that given a protocol pi in the
HM outputs a protocol pi′ = C(pi) such that pi′ HM-emulates pi in the HM.
Of course, with respect to the previous two definitions we are ultimately interested in protocols where pi′
is in the UM. However, since the UM is a special case of the HM, to facilitate future proofs we allow pi′ to
be in the HM in the above definitions.
Definition 8 Let λ be an mt-authenticator and let χ : N → {λ, φ} be a mapping from message number
to either the authenticator or φ (where φ indicates no authenticator), and message numbers of unauthentic
messages are required to be mapped to φ. Cχ is defined to be a HM-compiler that given a protocol pi in the
HM produces a protocol pi′ in the HM which is the same as pi except that it uses the authenticator λ to deliver
some of the authentic messages. Which messages are to be sent using λ is specified by χ, where a mapping of
a message to λ indicates that the authenticator should be used and a mapping to φ indicates no authenticator
is to be used and the message is to be sent in pi′ as an authentic message in the HM if it was authentic in pi,
or as an unauthentic message if it was unauthentic in pi.
Theorem 3 If λ is an mt-authenticator (i.e. in the UM it emulates the mt-protocol from the AM) then:
1. the HM-compiler Cχ given by Definition 8 is an HM-authenticator.
2. If pi′ = Cχ(pi) and pi is SK-secure, then pi′ is also SK-secure.
Proof The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3 by Bellare et al. [3], except for a slight modification in
the simulation to cater for the HM and unauthentic messages, as well as queries specific to key exchange
protocols such as the test session query and session key queries. It proceeds as follows:
Let pi be a protocol. We begin by showing that pi′ = Cχ(pi) HM-emulates pi in the HM. For clarity,
we denote the model in which pi runs HM1 and the model in which pi′ runs HM2. That is, let H2 be an
HM2 adversary that works against pi′. We construct an HM1 adversary H1 such that HYBRIDpi,H1 and
HYBRIDpi′,H2 have negligible statistical distance.
Adversary H1 operates in HM1, with (real) parties P1, . . . , Pn running pi. H1 also simulates the parties
P ′1, . . . , P
′
n in HM2 for H2, the HM2 adversary. Parties P ′1, . . . , P ′n do not actually exist, and neither do
they run protocol pi′. H1 simply generates output and messages on behalf of these imaginary parties for the
benefit of H2, since H2 interacts with HM2 parties. H1 runs λ on behalf of the imaginary parties P ′1, . . . , P ′n,
and orchestrates an interaction between H2 and λ, while using the parties P1 . . . Pn in HM1 to play the
(upper-layer) protocol pi to generate the messages sent and received via λ.
First H1 invokes λ. Next, H1 proceeds according to the following rules:
1. Whenever H2 activates P ′i with an external request, H1 activates (in its HM1 model) Pi with the same
request. For each outgoing authentic message that Pi generates in this activation, say for Pj , that pi′
specifies is to be delivered via λ, H1 activates protocol λ with external request for sending that message
from P ′i to P
′
j . Next H1 hands H2 all the outgoing messages generated by λ on behalf of P ′i , as well as any
outgoing unauthentic messages generated by Pi, any outgoing authentic messages generated by Pi that
are not to be delivered by λ (and must therefore be treated by H2 as authentic HM2 messages awaiting
delivery), and any outgoing requests and outputs that Pi may have generated.
2. Whenever H2 activates P ′i with an incoming authentic message m purportedly from P ′j , (so not generated
by the mt-authenticator), H1 delivers the same message to Pi as authentic with sender Pj . Any outgoing
messages and external requests generated by Pi are handled as above.
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3. Whenever H2 activates P ′i with an incoming unauthentic message m purportedly from P ′j , and according
to pi′, the next message that P ′i would receive is one not generated by the mt-authenticator, H1 delivers
the same message to Pi as unauthentic with sender Pj . Any outgoing messages and external requests
generated by Pi are handled as above.
4. WheneverH2 activates P ′i with an incoming unauthentic messagem, if (according to pi′) the next message
P ′i should receive is one via the authenticator, H1 first activates λ with this incoming message. Any
outgoing messages and external requests generated by λ on behalf of P ′i are handed by H1 to H2.
5. If any activation of λ outputs ‘P ′i received m from P
′
j ’ on behalf of P
′
i , then H1 activates, in HM1, party
Pi with incoming authentic message m from party Pj . Each outgoing message that Pi generates as a
result of this activation is handled as above.
6. Whenever H2 corrupts party P ′i , H1 corrupts Pi in HM1. H1 then hands H2 the internal data of Pi
together with the information regarding all activations of λ by (the imaginary) P ′i .
7. Whenever H2 expires a session at party P ′i , H1 expires the same session at Pi in HM1. H1 will no longer
return any local output (i.e. the session key) from this session to H2 upon corruption of P ′i . H2 may no
longer perform a session key query on this session at party P ′i , and H1 may no longer perform a session
key query on this session at party Pi.
8. Whenever H2 makes a session key query on session s at party P ′i , H1 makes a session key query on session
s at party Pi, and returns to H2 the key it received from its own query.
9. Whenever H2 chooses a test session s belonging to P ′i , H1 chooses session s belonging to Pi as its test
session and returns to P ′i the same key that it received in answer to its own test session query.
10. If H2 corrupts a session within some party P ′i then H1 corrupts the same session within Pi and hands
the corresponding information back to H2 together with the information regarding activations of λ by
(the imaginary) P ′i for that session.
11. H1 outputs whatever H2 outputs.
We first need to show that the above description of the behaviour of H1 is a legitimate behaviour of an
HM1 adversary. The above steps are easy to verify as legal moves for H1, except for step 5. In this case, it
could be possible that the triple (Pj , Pi,m) is not currently in the set of authentic undelivered messages in
HM1, and Pj (and the originating session within Pj) is uncorrupted. It is easy to see that if this is not the
case, namely if we assume that step 5 can always be carried out, then the above construction satisfies the
requirement for HYBRIDpi,H1 and HYBRIDpi′,H2 to have negligible statistical distance. This holds since the
simulated run with H2, together with the activations of the parties in HM1 is an exact imitation of a run of
H2 in HM2 with parties running pi′.
Thus, it remains to show that the probability that H1 cannot carry out step 5 is negligible. Assume that
protocol λ outputs ‘P ′i received m from P
′
j ’ on behalf of an uncorrupted party P
′
i . We show that, except with
negligible probability, the following events occur in HM1:
1. The triple (Pi, Pj ,m) was added to the set of authentic undelivered messages.
2. This triple was not yet deleted from the set of authentic undelivered messages (i.e. had not previously
been delivered as an authentic message).
To see (1), notice first that if, in the simulated run of H2, λ outputs ‘P ′i received m from P ′j ’ on behalf of
party P ′i , then λ had been invoked on behalf of P
′
j for sending m to P
′
i .
Otherwise, we construct from H2 a UM adversary U that contradicts the assumption that λ emulates mt.
U will simply run H2 (and complete H2’s missing information by running a simulated copy of pi). Whenever
H2 activates an imaginary party simulated by U , say P ′i , and during that activation that party ought to
send a message authenticated using λ, U activates the corresponding party with whom it interacts, P ′′i to
send the same message to the same recipient using λ. U passes messages and outputs pertaining to the
authenticator λ between the parties in its model and H2. U simulates the rest of the messages and outputs
pertaining to pi′ for H2 itself. U also simulates for H2 the other possible queries, such as party corruption
and session corruption, and completes any missing information it needs for the authenticator by corrupting
the corresponding party or session in its own model. Observe that the proofs of security of the authenticators
already existing in the literature do not consider expiry, session key and test session queries. However, this
is not a problem, since the only information H2 can receive from such queries is the session key. U is able to
answer these queries without interacting with the parties P ′′1 , P
′′
2 , . . . , P
′′
n in its own model, since the session
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key cannot depend on any information generated by the authenticator λ (otherwise the session key would
not be able to be specified in pi). Now, in the global output of the parties running λ with U the event that
some party accepts a message that was never sent occurs with non-negligible probability. Yet, in the AM,
with any adversary, this event never occurs. It now follows from the construction that Pj has sent m to Pi
in HM1. Thus the triple (Pi, Pj ,m) was added to the set of authentic undelivered messages.
To see (2), notice that, in the simulated run of H2, λ has not previously output ‘P ′i received m from
P ′j ’ on behalf of P
′
i . Otherwise it would be the case that λ outputs ‘P
′
i received m from P
′
j ’ twice on behalf
of P ′i , and as above one can construct from H2 a UM adversary U that contradicts the assumption that
λ emulates mt. It now follows from the construction that Pj was not previously activated in HM1 with
incoming authentic message m from Pj . Thus the triple (Pi, Pj ,m) was not deleted from the set of authentic
undelivered messages. Hence the HM-compiler Cχ given by Definition 8 is an HM-authenticator.
We now show that if pi′ = Cχ(pi) and pi is SK-secure, then pi′ is also SK-secure. Observe that since Cχ is
an HM-authenticator, if pi satisfies requirement 1 of Definition 1, so must pi′. Otherwise, the global outputs
from running pi and pi′ would be easily distinguishable.
In addition, if pi′ violates requirement 2 of Definition 1, then so must pi. This is true since if there exists
an adversary H2 against pi′ that has an advantage in outputting the correct bit b, and there does not exist
an adversary H1 with the same advantage, then HYBRIDpi,H1 and HYBRIDpi′,H2 will not have negligible
statistical distance, since the output of H2 will correctly indicate whether the answer to the test session was
real or random more often than the output of H1. uunionsq
Now that the necessary extension to the model has been described, it remains to specify how to change
the existing AM protocols to take advantage of it. Firstly, it is observed that changes to AM protocols
into HM protocols require new proofs of security. However, different variations of an HM protocol may be
possible, with different versions being better for use with different authenticators. The use of an HM template
is therefore proposed. An HM template shows the possible actions for each party, and specifies which actions
are prerequisites for others, and which may be performed in parallel. It also specifies which actions must be
performed in a single activation. Figure 3 shows the HM template for the Diffie-Hellman protocol at party
A. All messages are assumed to be authentic, unless otherwise specified, and actions that must be performed
in the same activation are shown in the one box and joined with “AND.” An arrow from one step to another
indicates that the first (prerequisite) step must be completed before the second is begun. Several arrows to
the one step mean that all of the prerequisite steps must be completed before that step is begun, unless the
arrows are combined with “or,” in which case only one of the prerequisite steps need be completed. Optional
steps are shown using dashed boxes. The session identifier s received from the adversary must be the same
as that received in the authentic message from B, otherwise the protocol halts without outputting a secret
key. The template for party B is identical, except for the renaming of A to B, B to A, x to y and y to x.
Assumption 1 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) [11]) Let k be a security parameter. Let primes p
and q be such that q is of length k bits and divides p− 1, and let g be of order q in Z∗p. Then the probability
distributions of quintuples Q0 = {〈p, g, gx, gy, gxy〉} : x, y, R← Zq} and Q1 = {〈p, g, gx, gy, gz〉} : x, y, z R← Zq}
are computationally indistinguishable.
Theorem 4 Any Diffie-Hellman based HM protocol where the actions of each party satisfy the requirements
specified in Figure 3 is SK-secure, provided no deadlock conditions occur (i.e. provided both parties are not
waiting for a message from the other party simultaneously) and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption is
true.
Proof The proof is similar to Canetti and Krawczyk’s Theorem 8 [11] as follows:
To see that if two uncorrupted parties complete matching sessions then they both output the same key
(requirement 1 of Definition 1), note that if both Pi and Pj are uncorrupted during the exchange of the key
and both complete the protocol with matching sessions, then they both establish the same key, which is gxy.
This is because the session identifier s uniquely binds the values of gx and gy to these particular matching
sessions and differentiates them from other exponentials that the parties may exchange in other (possibly
simultaneous) sessions.
We now show that requirement 2 of Definition 1 is met. Assume to the contrary that there is an adver-
sary H in the HM against the protocol that has a non-negligible advantage in guessing correctly whether the
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A and B share the common information of g and primes p and q such that
q is of length k bits and divides p− 1, and g is of order q in Z∗p.
1. Receive (A,B, φ, initiator) or (A,B, φ, responder) from the adversary, H
2. Receive (s, gy) from B
AND
Output: ‘A received (s, gy) from B’
3. Receive (gy) from B
UNAUTHENTICALLY
4. Choose x
? ? ?
?
@
@R
 
 	mor
?

5. Calculate gxy
?
6. Find gx
?

?
7. Erase x
?
8. Send (gx) to B or H
UNAUTHENTICALLY
9. Receive SID: s from the adversary
?
?
11. Send (s, gx) to B
AND
Output: ‘A sent (s, gx) to B’10. Output gxy as the secret for session s
?
Fig. 3 Possible step order for the Diffie-Hellman protocol in the AM, with optional steps in dashed boxes
response to a test-query is real or random. Out of this attacker H, we construct an algorithm D that distin-
guishes between the distributions Q0 and Q1 with non-negligible probability, thus reaching a contradiction
with Assumption 1. The input to D is denoted by (p, g, α∗, β∗, γ∗) and is chosen from Q0 or Q1 each with
probability 1/2. Let l be an upper bound on the number of sessions invoked by H for a particular party in
any interaction. D uses H as a subroutine and proceeds as follows:
1. Choose A,B R← {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} and rA, rB R← {1, 2, . . . , l}. We will refer to A’s rAth session and B’s
rB
th session the target sessions.
2. Invoke H on a simulated interaction in the HM with parties P1, . . . , Pn running the DH protocol. Hand
H the values p and g as the public parameters for the protocol execution.
3. Whenever H activates a party to establish a new session (except for the target sessions) or to receive a
message, follow the instructions of the DH protocol on behalf of that party. When a session is expired at
a player erase the corresponding session key from that player’s memory. When a party is corrupted or a
session (other than a target session) is exposed, hand H all the information corresponding to that party
or session as in a real interaction.
4. When A’s rAth session is invoked within A to exchange a key with Pj , if B 6= Pj , then D outputs
b′ R← {0, 1} and halts. Otherwise, whenever A would send the message (gx) or (s, gx) to B (either
authentically or unauthentically) let A send the message (α∗) or (s, α∗) to B instead.
5. When B’s rBth session is invoked to exchange a key with Pi, if A 6= Pi, then D outputs b′ R← {0, 1}
and halts. Otherwise, whenever B would send the message (gy) or (s′, gy) to A (either authentically or
unauthentically) let B send the message (β∗) or (s′, β∗) to A instead.
6. If a target session is chosen by H as the test-session, and both the target sessions have the same session
identifier s, then provide H with γ∗ as the answer to this query. (Whether the sessions have the same
session identifier can be deduced from the outputs of the session. A session matching the test session must
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exist, since completion of the test session means that it has received an authentic message containing the
session identifier from the other party. Furthermore, that session identifier must be in the other party’s
output. If either of the target sessions has not produced any output containing its session identifier, then
it is not a partner of the test session.)
7. If a target session is ever exposed, or a session other than a target session is chosen as the test-session, or
if the test session does not match either of the target sessions, or if H halts without choosing a test-session
then D outputs b′ R← {0, 1} and halts.
8. If H halts and outputs a bit b′, then D halts and outputs b′ too.
First note that the run of H by D up to the point where H stops (or D aborts H’s run) is identical to a
normal run of H against the DH protocol.
Secondly, note that in step 3, it is always possible for D to answer the corrupt and exposure queries of
H, unless step 7 specifies that D should output a random bit and halt. This is so since if D is not to output
a random bit and halt:
– if any session is exposed, it must not be a target session. Therefore the discrete logarithms of α∗ and β∗
will not be part of the exposed session’s state in any way. Also γ∗ will not be part of the session’s state.
– if any session is corrupted other than a target session, the discrete logarithms of α∗ and β∗ will not be
part of the corrupted session’s state in any way. Also, γ∗ will not be part of the session’s state.
– if a target session is corrupted, the corrupted session must first have been expired. However, if the session
was expired, it must also have been completed, and if it was completed, then the discrete logarithm of
the exponential generated by the session ought to have been erased. Therefore, the discrete logarithms
of α∗ and β∗ will not be part of the corrupted session’s state in any way. γ∗ will not be part of the state
either, since the expiry erased the session key.
Consider the case in which the test session chosen by H coincides with a target session chosen at random
by D. In this case, the response to the test-query by H is γ∗. Thus, if the input to D came from Q0 then
the response was the actual value of the key exchanged between Pi and Pj during the test-session (since,
by construction, the session key exchanged in Steps 4 and 5 of the actions of D is γ∗ = gxy). On the other
hand, if the input to D came from Q1 then the response to the test query was a random exponentiation,
i.e. a random value from the distribution of keys generated by the protocol. In addition, the input to D
was chosen with probability 1/2 from Q0 and with probability 1/2 from Q1, so the distribution of responses
provided by D to the test query of H is the same as specified by Definition 1. In this case, the probability
that H guesses correctly whether the test value was “real” or “random” is 1/2 +  for non-negligible . By
the above argument this is equivalent to guessing whether the input to the distinguisher D came from Q0
or Q1, respectively. Thus, by outputting the same bit as H we get that the distinguisher D guesses correctly
the input distribution Q0 or Q1 with the same probability 1/2 +  as H did.
Now consider the case in which a target session is not chosen as a test-session. In this case D always ends
outputting a random bit, and thus its probability to guess correctly the input distribution is 1/2.
Since the first case (in which the test-session and a target session coincide) happens with probability
1
n2l2 while the other case happens with probability 1 − 1n2l2 , the overall probability of D to guess correctly
is 1/2 + n2l2 , and thus D succeeds in distinguishing Q0 from Q1 with non-negligible advantage. uunionsq
Although the original 2DH protocol of Canetti and Krawczyk [11] included the identity of the sender in
the protocol messages, it has not been explicitly included in messages here. It is assumed that the identities
of the sender and recipient of the message are provided automatically. For authenticated HM messages, such
information must be provided in any case for the message to be authentic. For unauthenticated messages, if
there is no other source for the information (such as a header field on the message) it may be necessary to
add the information to the message in practice. However, it is omitted here for clarity. As can be seen above,
this has not affected the proof.
An examination of Figure 3 shows that quite a number of steps can be performed if one party has
possession of the other’s unauthentic Diffie-Hellman value. Therefore, it seems logical to specify an HM
protocol such as the one shown by Protocol 4 that allows a party to receive an unauthentic Diffie-Hellman
value and then carry out as many actions as possible. The steps carried out by the other party are then fairly
straightforward since the other party’s Diffie-Hellman value is required before most steps can be carried out.
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Messages that are not labelled “unauthentic” are authentic. In this version of the protocol, the adversary
chooses the Diffie-Hellman values, (tA, tB) to be the session identifier. The unauthentic message tB from B
is addressed to the adversary and is never delivered to A. It is used to allow the adversary to create the
session identifier.
A B
rA ∈R Zq
tA = g
rA
Unauthentic: tA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ rB ∈R Zq
tB = g
rB
KBA = t
rB
A
Erase rB
H Unauthentic: tB←−−−−−−−−−−−−H s = (tA, tB)−−−−−−−−→
‘B sent (s, tB) to A’
s, tB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
‘A rec. (s, tB) from B’
KAB = t
rA
B
Erase rA
s = (tA, tB)←−−−−−−−− H
‘Established (A,B, s,KAB)’
‘A sent (s, tA) to B’
s, tA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ‘B rec. (s, tA) from A’
‘Established (B,A, s,KBA)’
Protocol 4. Secure Diffie-Hellman protocol in the HM
Protocol 5 shows another version of the Diffie-Hellman protocol where the adversary no longer inputs
the session identifier to the parties. (Note that tA and tB are unique to each session except with negligible
probability.) In addition, messages containing the same term twice have had the second term removed, and
the unauthentic message to the adversary has been removed. However, it is still SK-secure, by the following
theorem.
Theorem 5 If Protocol 4 is secure then so is Protocol 5.
Proof For convenience, let pi denote Protocol 4 and pi′ denote Protocol 5 throughout the proof. Protocol pi′
satisfies the first requirement of Definition 1 since the same key is calculated in pi′ and pi. Therefore, it remains
to show that the second requirement is satisfied. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an adversary H′
against pi′ with a non-negligible advantage. Then we construct an adversary H against pi that has a non-
negligible advantage. H runs H′ and simulates an interaction of H′ with imaginary parties P ′1, P ′2, . . . , P ′n
running Protocol 5. The simulation proceeds as follows:
– Whenever H′ activates P ′i to start the protocol with P ′j as an initiator (or responder respectively), H
activates the corresponding party, Pi, in its own model to start a protocol run with Pj as the initiator
(or responder respectively).
– Whenever a party Pi outputs an unauthentic message, H causes P ′i to output the same unauthentic
message to H′, except in the case where the unauthentic message output by Pi was from the responder
and addressed to H.
– Whenever a party Pi outputs an authentic message (s, tA) to Pj where s = (tA, tB), H causes P ′i to pass
(tA, tB) to H′ for delivery as an authentic message to P ′j .
– Whenever a party Pj outputs an authentic message (s, tB) to Pi where s = (tA, tB), H causes P ′j to pass
(tA, tB) to H′ for delivery as an authentic message to P ′i .
– Whenever an unauthentic message is delivered to a party P ′j by H′, H delivers the same unauthentic
message to Pj .
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A B
rA ∈R Zq
tA = g
rA
Unauthentic: tA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ rB ∈R Zq
tB = g
rB
KBA = t
rB
A
Erase rB
Set SID = s = (tA, tB)
‘B sent (tA, tB) to A’
tA, tB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
‘A rec. (tA, tB) from B’
KAB = t
rA
B
Erase rA
Set SID = s = (tA, tB)
‘Established (A,B, s,KAB)’
‘A sent (tA, tB) to B’
tA, tB−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ‘B rec. (tA, tB) from A’
‘Established (B,A, s,KBA)’
Protocol 5. Secure Diffie-Hellman protocol in the HM suitable for optimization
– Whenever an authentic message (tA, tB) is delivered to a party P ′j from P
′
i by H′, if Pj is a responder,
H delivers ((tA, tB), tA) as an authentic message from Pi to Pj . Otherwise, since Pj is an initiator, H
delivers ((tA, tB), tB) as an authentic message from Pi to Pj .
– Whenever a party Pi is waiting for a session identifier to be input, H calculates the session identifier in
the same way as in pi and inputs it to Pi.
– Whenever a party Pi outputs that it has established a session key, H causes P ′i to output the same thing.
– Whenever H′ chooses a session as the test session, H chooses the corresponding session (i.e. the one with
the same session identifier and run by the corresponding party) in its own model and passes the value it
receives in response to its test session query to H′.
– Whenever H′ corrupts a party or a session, or performs a session key query, H corrupts the corresponding
party or session or performs a session key query on the corresponding session in its own model and passes
whatever it receives to H′.
– Whenever H′ expires a session, H expires the corresponding session in its own model.
– H outputs whatever H′ outputs.
Observe that any session s′ with which H′ interacts will have the same session identifier and secret key
(if they have been set) as the corresponding session s with which H interacts. Furthermore, the matching
session to s will correspond to the matching session to s′ (if it exists). In addition, no two sessions belonging
to one party will have the same session identifier (this is a requirement of the HM). Hence, H will have the
same advantage against Protocol 4 as H′ has against Protocol 5. uunionsq
Although the above theorem and proof are for Protocols 4 and 5, other protocols may be changed in a
similar way so that the session identifier may be specified by the protocol, instead of being chosen by the
adversary. A proof would then be constructed in a similar way.
Of the remaining key exchange protocols in the AM, the key transport [11] and ElGamal type [16]
protocols only contain one message and hence can be compiled using only one mt-authenticator, which is
likely to eliminate the need to alter the order of AM steps. Therefore, no templates of possible step order
are provided for these protocols. The server-based key transport protocol [15] may be placed in the same
category if the server sends its encryptions of the session key directly to each of the two other participants.
However, if the session identifier is to be constructed from values generated within the protocol, a proof of
the protocol with this modification in the HM will need to be provided, similarly to Theorems 4 and 5.
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4 Using Two or More Authenticators
In some situations it may be desirable to use more than one mt-authenticator in the one protocol, for example
when the two parties in the protocol do not have the same level of computational power. Let λ1, λ2, . . . , λl
be l mt-authenticators to be used at once. (For all current AM protocols l ≤ 2, but the general case seems
just as easy to prove.) Let Λ : N→ {λ1, λ2, . . . , λl, φ} be a mapping from message number to authenticator
(where a mapping of a message to φ indicates no authenticator is to be used and the message is to be sent
in the compiled protocol as an authentic message in the HM if it was an authentic message in the original
protocol, and otherwise the message is to be sent as an unauthentic message in the compiled protocol). Let
CΛ(pi) be the HM-compiler that uses mt-authenticators λ1, λ2, . . . , λl to transform protocol pi to protocol pi′,
where Λ specifies which mt-authenticator to apply to which message of pi, and pi′ proceeds as follows:
– pi′ first invokes the initialization procedure for each authenticator, λ1, λ2, . . . , λl (note that each authen-
ticator has independent state),
– each message of pi is converted to one or more messages in pi′ as follows (with the original message ordering
of pi maintained in pi′):
– an unauthentic message sent (or received) in pi is converted to exactly the same message to be sent
(or received) in pi′ with the same sender and recipient. (Of course, since no modifications to provide
any authentication are made for unauthentic messages, it is possible that in an execution of pi′, the
adversary will change the recipient, message contents or purported sender. However, this could also
have happened to the corresponding message in an execution of pi.)
– an authentic message m sent (or received) in pi is converted to a message m sent (or received) using
authenticator λk with the same sender and recipient, where k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, and λk was specified
by Λ for this message. Hence, the sending (or receiving) of message m in pi may be converted to the
sending and receiving of several messages in pi′ via the authenticator λk. However, an exception is an
authentic message mapped by Λ to φ. In this case, no authenticator is to be used and the message is
to be sent in pi′ as an authentic message in the HM.
– any output specified by pi is also specified by pi′ and occurs in pi′ in the same order and in connection
with the same message(s) as in pi. I.e. output before an authentic message is sent in pi occurs in pi′ before
the authenticator is activated to send that message. Output after an authentic message is received in pi
occurs in pi′ after the authenticator has received the message. Any other actions (e.g. choosing random
values, exponentiation, conditional actions, etc.) specified by pi are converted to pi′ in a similar way.
Theorem 6 The compiler CΛ as described above is an HM-authenticator.
Proof Wemust show that pi′ HM-emulates pi. This can be seen by constructing intermediate HM-authenticators
Cχ1 , Cχ2 , . . . , Cχl where we let pii = Cχi(pii−1) for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l} and pi0 = pi. χi is defined such that if
Λ(j) = λi then χi(j) = λi. Otherwise, χi(j) = φ. That Cχ1 , Cχ2 , . . . , Cχl are HM-authenticators can be seen
by Theorem 3. Therefore, for any adversary Hi against pii for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, there exists an adversary
Hi−1 against pii−1 such that HYBRIDpii−1,Hi−1 and HYBRIDpii,Hi are computationally indistinguishable.
Therefore, we can deduce that for any adversary Hl against pil = pi′, there exists an adversary H0 against
pi0 = pi such that HYBRIDpi0,H0 and HYBRIDpil,Hl are computationally indistinguishable and therefore pi
′
HM-emulates pi. uunionsq
As an example, Protocol 6 shows the Diffie-Hellman Protocol 5 from the HM authenticated with two
different authenticators, the signature-based authenticator of Fig. 1 and the encryption-based authenticator
of Fig. 2. The public and private keys used for the signature authenticator must be separate from those used
for the encryption authenticator for the proof to hold. This example protocol will be further optimized in
the following sections.
5 Optimizations for Existing Authenticators
Now that an HM protocol suitable for emulation has been described and the use of multiple authenticators
has been justified, we wish to use various optimizations to derive an efficient protocol in the UM. We first
clarify the definitions of existing authenticators to make them as flexible as possible.
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A B
rA ∈R Zq
tA = g
rA
tA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ rB ∈R Zq
tB = g
rB
KBA = t
rB
A
Erase rB
Set SID = s = (tA, tB)
‘B sent (tA, tB) to A’
tA, tB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
NA ∈R {0, 1}k tA, tB , NA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ σ = SigB(tA, tB , NA, A)
tA, tB , σ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check σ = SigB(tA, tB , NA, A);
if not then abort.
‘A rec. (tA, tB) from B’
KAB = t
rA
B
Erase rA
Set SID = s = (tA, tB)
‘Established (A,B, s,KAB)’
‘A sent (tA, tB) to B’
tA, tB−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ NB ∈R {0, 1}k
c = EPKA(NB)
tA, tB , c←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
NB = DSKA(c)
µ = MACNB (tA, tB , B)
tA, tB , µ−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check µ = MACNB (tA, tB , B);
if not then abort.
‘B rec. (tA, tB) from A’
‘Established (B,A, s,KBA)’
Protocol 6. Unoptimized Diffie-Hellman protocol in the UM (two authenticators)
5.1 Flexibility of Existing Authenticators
Figures 1, 2, and 4 to 6 give a description of the various authenticators for the CK model that currently
exist in the literature. (More precise descriptions including details of the initialization process appear in the
original proposals, apart from that of the MAC-based authenticator, which is very sketchy.) The notation
used in the authenticators is as follows:
m: unique message to be transmitted authentically,
κAB : shared fixed key, for example derived from static Diffie-Hellman keys,
pi: password of A, shared with B,
γ: threshold for number of failed logons per party,
eP : public encryption key of party P ,
sP : secret signature key of party P ,
MK(x): MAC of x under key K,
EK(x): encryption of x under key K,
σK(x): signature of x under key K,
H(x): hash of x.
The following conditions pertain to authenticators λp-enc, λsig, λenc, λmac, and λstatic. They provide
slightly more flexibility that the original definitions of these authenticators but their original security proofs
remain essentially unchanged. The notation used is that the authenticator is to deliver some message m from
some party A to some other party B.
1. As soon as A is activated (e.g. by U or a higher layer protocol) to send m to B, A must output ‘A sent
m to B’. Hereafter, we call this activation the send activation.
Modular Proofs for Key Exchange 19
A (Client) (Server) B
‘A sent m to B’ m−→ NB ∈R {0, 1}
k
m,NB←−−−−
m, EeB (m,NB , A, pi)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Decrypt EeB (m,NB , A, pi)
If m,A, pi are correct, NB is outstanding, and failed logons for A ≤ γ
Then output ‘B received m from A’ and remove NB from the list of
outstanding nonces.
Else if A a valid user, increase the number of failed logons for A by 1.
Fig. 4 Password Based Authenticator, λp-enc [13]
A B
‘A sent m to B’ m−→
NB ∈R {0, 1}2k
m,NB←−−−−
µ =MκAB (B,NB ,m) m,µ−−→ Check µ =MκAB (B,NB ,m); if not, then abort.
‘B received m from A’
Fig. 5 MAC-based mt-authenticator, λmac [11]
A B
‘A sent m to B’
m−−−−−−−−−−→
NB ∈R {0, 1}k
m,NB←−−−−−−−−−−
h = H(κAB , B,NB ,m)
m,h−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check h = H(κAB , B,NB ,m); if not, then abort.
‘B received m from A’
Fig. 6 Authenticator using static key agreement, λstatic [7]
2. A may send m or part thereof, by itself or as part of another message, unauthentically any number of
times (including zero) to B at any time after the send activation. All of the authenticators except for
λp-enc require B to know m (by this or some other means) before B can receive m authentically. However,
it is possible that if the authenticator is being used as part of a larger protocol, that protocol may have
delivered m to B before the send activation. In practice, if m is removed from a message of the output
protocol, a “hint” (such as a session identifier) to enable the communicating parties to establish to which
session the message belongs may need to be added in place of m, although the use of such a “hint” does
not affect the security of the authenticator.
3. A may receive EeA(NB) in the case of λenc, or NB in other cases, (alone or as part of another message) at
any time before the send activation, at the same time as the send activation, or after the send activation.
However, in the case of λenc, NB must be erased by A in the same activation as it is decrypted.
4. After A has received EeA(NB) in the case of λenc, or NB in other cases, and after outputting ‘A sent m
to B’ in the send activation, A can construct and send to B:
– EeB (m,NB , A, pi) for λp-enc,
– σsA(m,NB , B) for λsig,
– MNB (m,B) for λenc
– MκAB (B,NB ,m) for λmac, or
– H(κAB , B,NB ,m) for λstatic.
5. B may choose to send EeA(NB) in the case of λenc, or NB in other cases, to A at any time. (B need not
wait for a message from A to do this, and NB may not need to be sent at all if A is able to derive its value
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in some other way, e.g. from the session identifier.) Once NB is chosen, it is recorded as an outstanding
nonce.
6. In λp-enc, λsig, λmac, and λstatic, NB may be any value of B’s choice (including a value chosen by the
adversary), that has not previously been used as a nonce in the same authenticator by B, except with
negligible probability.
7. Suppose NB is an outstanding nonce previously output or chosen by this invocation of a certain authen-
ticator in B. When B receives or knows the value of the last message in the authenticator it accepts m
(i.e. outputs ‘B received m from A’) and notes that NB is no longer an outstanding nonce as long as:
– in the case of λp-enc, it can decrypt EeB (m,NB , A, pi) intom, NB , A, pi, pi is a password shared between
A and B, and the number of unsuccessful attempts to complete the protocol with A is less than or
equal to the previously chosen threshold, γ. Otherwise, if A is a valid client, B increases the number
of unsuccessful attempts to complete the protocol with A by one.
– in the case of λsig, if it can verify the signature successfully.
– in the case of λenc, if it can verify the MAC. Otherwise, B terminates this invocation of λenc without
accepting any message and notes that NB is no longer an outstanding nonce.
– in the case of λmac, if it can verify the MAC, κAB is the long term shared key between A and B.
– in the case of λstatic, if it can verify the hash, κAB is the long term shared key between A and B.
Definition 9 An activation of an authenticator in which a party Pi outputs ‘Pi sent m to Pj ’ for some
message m and party Pj is called a send activation.
Definition 10 All messages in an authenticator that may be sent and received before the send activation are
called preamble messages.
Note that specification of which messages may be sent at various times is part of the authenticator
definition. We observe that the message EeA(NB) in the case of λenc, or NB in the case of λp-enc, λsig, λmac,
and λstatic is a preamble message.
In Protocol 6, m = (s, tA) for the first authenticator. In accordance with the above authenticator defini-
tions, Protocol 7 shows this example protocol with the first message of the authenticator removed, since the
message only consists of m = (s, tA). In addition, the value m = (s, tA) was omitted in the second authen-
ticator message (containing the nonce). However, it is still possible for the recipient to obtain m = (s, tA)
from the last authenticator message. The same changes were also made for the second authenticator, but
with m = (s, tB) in that case.
5.2 Some Parts of Authenticator Messages Can Be Shifted and Protocol Values Used for Nonces
As discussed in Section 3, it seems that AM messages and actions cannot be reordered without providing
a new proof of security for the AM protocol. However, it is often desirable to shift some authenticator
messages to occur at an earlier point in the protocol. For example, it seems desirable to combine the first
and second messages and third and fourth messages of Protocol 7. This involves invoking the authenticator
at the recipient of the authentic message and transmitting the authenticator message containing the nonce
or encrypted nonce in an earlier activation than previously. It remains to be proven that this can be done
without affecting the SK-security of the protocol.
Another attractive optimization is to replace the nonce NA in Protocol 7 with the protocol value tA. It
also remains to be proven that this can be done without affecting the SK-security of the protocol.
Theorem 7 Suppose that an HM-authenticator, CΛ, built as described in Section 4 from mt-authenticators
λ1, λ2, . . . , λl, has been used to compile an SK-secure HM protocol, pi, into pi′ = CΛ(pi). Furthermore, suppose
that another protocol, pi′′ has been constructed from pi′ by moving some messages to an earlier point in the
protocol and/or by replacing some values with values from other parts of pi′. Suppose these changes are subject
to the following conditions:
– When some message, g, from Pi to Pj, is moved to an earlier point in pi′′ than in pi′, g must be produced
by λi for i ∈ {1, . . . , l} to deliver some message m in pi. Furthermore, g must be a preamble message in
λi.
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A B
rA ∈R Zq
tA = g
rA
tA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ rB ∈R Zq
tB = g
rB
KBA = t
rB
A
Erase rB
Set SID = s = (tA, tB)
‘B sent (tA, tB) to A’
NA ∈R {0, 1}k NA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ σ = SigB(tA, tB , NA, A)
tA, tB , σ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check σ = SigB(tA, tB , NA, A);
if not then abort.
‘A rec. (tA, tB) from B’
KAB = t
rA
B
Erase rA
Set SID = s = (tA, tB)
‘Established (A,B, s,KAB)’
‘A sent (tA, tB) to B’ NB ∈R {0, 1}k
c = EPKA(NB)
c←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
NB = DSKA(c)
µ = MACNB (tA, tB , B)
tA, tB , µ−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check µ = MACNB (tA, tB , B);
if not then abort.
‘B rec. (tA, tB) from A’
‘Established (B,A, s,KBA)’
Protocol 7. Partially optimized Diffie-Hellman protocol in the UM (first message of authenticators removed)
– When some value, h, generated by some party Pj in actions and messages produced by some authenticator,
λi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, is replaced by some other value, h′, from pi′, λi must allow h to be any value of
Pj’s choice (including a value chosen by the adversary), that has not previously been used in the same
authenticator by Pj, except with negligible probability. Furthermore, h′ must be a value which has not been
used in the same authenticator by Pj, except with negligible probability. Also, by the time a term equal to
or derived from h′ is generated or used in a message in place of h in pi′′, h′ must already be known to the
adversary or be able to be derived by the adversary.
Then protocol pi′′ is SK-secure.
Proof Suppose that the theorem is not true and that pi′′ is not SK-secure. pi′′ meets the first requirement of
Definition 1 since the values used to calculate the secret key remain unchanged from pi. Therefore, we assume
that the second requirement is violated and that an adversary U against pi′′ exists having a non-negligible
advantage.
We now construct several protocols, pi′′0 , . . . , pi
′′
l where pi
′′
0 = pi and pi
′′
l = pi
′′ and pi′′k for k ∈ {0, . . . , l−1} is
the same as pi′′k+1 except that all messages in pi
′′
k+1 that correspond to the use of λk+1 to deliver a message m
from pi (including shifted messages and messages with replaced values) are removed from pi′′k and instead the
message m is delivered authentically in the HM in pi′′k . If messages in pi
′′
k now require the use of values whose
generation has been deleted (because they were generated by λk+1 or input by the adversary to λk+1), each
value is marked as being required to be input by the adversary the first time it is used, but the adversary
is subject to the condition that it choose a value that has not been used previously by the authenticator(s)
that use the value. (Observe that the value had not previously been used by the authenticator(s) in question
in pi′′k+1 due to the requirements of the theorem being proven.)
Furthermore, we construct adversariesH0, . . . ,Hl whereHl = U such that HYBRIDpi′′k ,Hk and HYBRIDpi′′k+1,Hk+1
have negligible statistical distance for all k ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1}.
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Adversary Hk for k ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1} operates in the HM, with (real) parties P1, . . . , Pn running pi′′k . Hk
also simulates the parties P ′1, . . . , P
′
n for Hk+1, the adversary against pi′′k+1. Parties P ′1, . . . , P ′n do not actually
exist, and neither do they run protocol pi′′k+1. Hk simply generates output and messages on behalf of these
imaginary parties for the benefit of Hk+1, since Hk+1 interacts with parties running pi′′k+1. Hk runs λk+1 on
behalf of the imaginary parties P ′1, . . . , P
′
n, and orchestrates an interaction between Hk+1 and λk+1, while
using the parties P1 . . . Pn to play the protocol pi′′k to generate the messages sent and received via λk+1.
First Hk invokes λk+1. Next, Hk proceeds according to the following rules:
1. Whenever Hk+1 activates P ′i with an external request, Hk activates Pi with the same request. For each
outgoing authentic message that Pi generates in this activation, say for Pj , that pi′′k+1 specifies is to be
delivered via λk+1, Hk activates protocol λk+1 with external request for sending that message from P ′i
to P ′j .
Furthermore, if λk+1 on behalf of P ′i must choose a value in this activation that has been replaced with
another value in pi′′k+1 (e.g. from pi or from another authenticator), Hk inputs this value to λk+1. (Note
that the theorem stipulates that this value must be known to Hk+1, and so it is also known to Hk since
it is running an internal copy of Hk+1.)
Next Hk hands Hk+1 all the outgoing messages generated by λk+1 on behalf of P ′i , as well as any outgoing
unauthentic messages generated by Pi, any outgoing authentic messages generated by Pi that are not to
be delivered by λk+1 (and must therefore be treated by Hk+1 as authentic messages awaiting delivery),
and any outgoing requests and outputs that Pi may have generated.
2. Whenever Hk+1 activates P ′i with an incoming authentic message m purportedly from P ′j , (not generated
by the mt-authenticator), Hk delivers the same message to Pi as authentic with sender Pj . Any outgoing
messages and external requests generated by Pi are handled as above.
3. Whenever Hk+1 activates P ′i with an incoming unauthentic message m purportedly from P ′j , and ac-
cording to pi′′k+1, the next message that P
′
i would receive is one not generated by the mt-authenticator,
Hk delivers the same message to Pi as unauthentic with sender Pj . Any outgoing messages and external
requests generated by Pi are handled as above.
4. Whenever Hk+1 activates P ′i with an incoming unauthentic message m, if (according to pi′′k+1) the next
message P ′i should receive is one via the authenticator,Hk first activates λk+1 with this incoming message.
Furthermore, if λk+1 on behalf of P ′i must choose a value in this activation that has been replaced with
another value in pi′′k+1 (e.g. from pi or from another authenticator), Hk inputs this value to λk+1. (Note
that the theorem stipulates that this value must be known to Hk+1, and so it is also known to Hk since
it is running an internal copy of Hk+1.)
Any outgoing messages and external requests generated by λk+1 on behalf of P ′i are handed by Hk to
Hk+1.
5. If any activation of λk+1 outputs ‘P ′i received m from P
′
j ’ on behalf of P
′
i , then Hk activates party Pi
with incoming authentic message m from party Pj . Each outgoing message that Pi generates as a result
of this activation is handled as above.
6. Whenever pi′′k requires a value to be input by the adversary for use in an authenticator, Hk inputs the
same value as would have been used in pi′′k+1, from either λk+1 or Hk+1, whichever is appropriate.
7. Whenever Hk+1 corrupts party P ′i , Hk corrupts Pi. Hk then hands Hk+1 the internal data of Pi together
with the information regarding all activations of λk+1 by (the imaginary) P ′i .
8. Whenever Hk+1 expires a session at party P ′i , Hk expires the same session at Pi. Hk will no longer return
any local output (i.e. the session key) from this session to Hk+1 upon corruption of P ′i . Hk+1 may no
longer perform a session key query on this session at party P ′i , and Hk may no no longer perform a session
key query on this session at party Pi.
9. Whenever Hk+1 makes a session key query on session s at party P ′i , Hk makes a session key query on
session s at party Pi, and returns to Hk+1 the key it received from its own query.
10. Whenever Hk+1 chooses a test session s belonging to P ′i , Hk chooses session s belonging to Pi as its test
session and returns to P ′i the same key that it received in answer to its own test session query.
11. If Hk+1 corrupts a session within some party P ′i then Hk corrupts the same session within Pi and hands
the corresponding information back to Hk+1 together with the information regarding activations of λk+1
by (the imaginary) P ′i for that session.
12. Hk outputs whatever Hk+1 outputs.
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We first need to show that the above description of the behaviour of Hk is a legitimate behaviour of an
adversary against pi′′k . Observe that the simulation above does not have any problem with messages shifted
to an earlier point in pi′′ than pi′, since the only messages shifted are preamble messages and therefore the
authenticator λk+1 can be activated to send and receive these messages when required by pi′′k+1. The above
steps are easy to verify as legal moves for Hk, except for step 5. In this case, it could be possible that the
triple (Pj , Pi,m) is not currently in the set of authentic undelivered messages, and Pj (and the originating
session within Pj) is uncorrupted. It is easy to see that if this is not the case, namely if we assume that
step 5 can always be carried out, then the above construction satisfies the requirement for HYBRIDpi′′k ,Hk
and HYBRIDpi′′k+1,Hk+1 to have negligible statistical distance. This holds since the simulated run with Hk+1,
together with the activations of the parties P1, P2, . . . , Pn is an exact imitation of a run of Hk+1 with parties
running pi′′k+1.
Thus, it remains to show that the probability that Hk cannot carry out step 5 is negligible. Assume that
protocol λk+1 outputs ‘P ′i received m from P
′
j ’ on behalf of an uncorrupted party P
′
i . We show that, except
with negligible probability, the following events occur in the HM1:
1. The triple (Pi, Pj ,m) was added to the set of authentic undelivered messages.
2. This triple was not yet deleted from the set of authentic undelivered messages (i.e. had not previously
been delivered as an authentic message).
To see (1), notice first that if, in the simulated run of Hk+1, λk+1 outputs ‘P ′i received m from P ′j ’ on
behalf of party P ′i , then λk+1 had been invoked on behalf of P
′
j for sending m to P
′
i .
Otherwise, we construct from Hk+1 a UM adversary U interacting with parties P ′′1 , P ′′2 , . . . , P ′′n that
contradicts the assumption that λk+1 emulates mt. U will simply run Hk+1 (and complete Hk+1’s missing
information by running a simulated copy of pi′′k ). Whenever Hk+1 activates an imaginary party simulated
by U , say P ′i , and during that activation that party ought to send a message authenticated using λk+1, U
activates the corresponding party with whom it interacts, P ′′i to send the same message to the same recipient
using λk+1. U passes messages and outputs pertaining to the authenticator λk+1 between the parties in its
model and Hk+1.
Furthermore, if λk+1 must choose a value in this activation that has been replaced with another value
in pi′′k+1 (e.g. from pi or from another authenticator), U inputs this value to λk+1. (Note that the theorem
stipulates that this value must be known to Hk+1, and so it is also known to U since it is running an internal
copy of Hk+1.)
U simulates the rest of the messages and outputs pertaining to pi′′k+1 for Hk+1 itself. U also simulates for
Hk+1 the other possible queries, such as party corruption and session corruption, and completes any missing
information it needs for the authenticator by corrupting the corresponding party or session in its own
model. Observe that expiry, session key and test session queries are not considered in the proofs of existing
authenticators. However, this is not a problem, since the only information Hk+1 can receive from such queries
is the session key. U is able to answer these queries without interacting with the parties P ′′1 , P ′′2 , . . . , P ′′n in
its own model, since the session key cannot depend on any information generated by the authenticator
λk+1 (otherwise the session key would not be able to be specified in pi′′k ). Now, in the global output of the
parties running λk+1 with U the event that some party accepts a message that was never sent occurs with
non-negligible probability. Yet, in the AM, with any adversary, this event never occurs. It now follows from
the construction that Pj has sent m to Pi. Thus the triple (Pi, Pj ,m) was added to the set of authentic
undelivered messages.
To see (2), notice that, in the simulated run of Hk+1, λk+1 has not previously output ‘P ′i received m
from P ′j ’ on behalf of P
′
i . Otherwise it would be the case that λk+1 outputs ‘P
′
i received m from P
′
j ’ twice on
behalf of P ′i , and as above one can construct from Hk+1 a UM adversary U that contradicts the assumption
that λk+1 emulates mt. It now follows from the construction that Pj was not previously activated with
incoming authentic message m from Pj . Thus the triple (Pi, Pj ,m) was not deleted from the set of authentic
undelivered messages.
Let Ck+1 be the compiler required to generate pi′′k+1 from pi′′k (i.e. pi′′k+1 = Ck+1(pi′′k )). Then we have shown
that Ck+1 is an HM-authenticator.
We now show that if pi′′k is SK-secure, then pi
′′
k+1 is also SK-secure. Observe that since Ck+1 is an HM-
authenticator, if pi′′k satisfies requirement 1 of Definition 1, so must pi
′′
k+1. Otherwise, the global outputs from
running pi′′k and pi
′′
k+1 would be easily distinguishable.
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In addition, if pi′′k+1 violates requirement 2 of Definition 1, then so must pi
′′
k . This is true since if there
exists an adversary Hk+1 against pi′′k+1 that has an advantage in outputting the correct bit b, and there does
not exist an adversary Hk with the same advantage, then HYBRIDpi′′k ,Hk and HYBRIDpi′′k+1,Hk+1 will not
have negligible statistical distance, since the output of Hk+1 will correctly indicate whether the answer to
the test session was real or random more often than the output of Hk.
Since pi′′0 = pi is SK-secure, pi
′′
1 , pi
′′
2 , . . . , pi
′′
l−1, pi
′′
l = pi
′′ are all also SK-secure. uunionsq
Protocol 8 shows Protocol 7 modified to replace NA of λsig with tA and to move the messages NA and c
to earlier parts of the protocol. Messages sent by the same party immediately after one another are combined
into one message with duplicate terms removed. By Theorem 7, Protocol 8 is SK-secure.
A B
rA ∈R Zq
tA = g
rA
tA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ rB ∈R Zq
tB = g
rB
KBA = t
rB
A
Erase rB
Set SID = s = (tA, tB)
‘B sent (tA, tB) to A’
σ = SigB(tA, tB , tA, A)
NB ∈R {0, 1}k
c = EPKA(NB)
s, σ, c←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check σ = SigB(tA, tB , tA, A);
if not then abort.
‘A rec. (tA, tB) from B’
KAB = t
rA
B
Erase rA
Set SID = s = (tA, tB)
‘Established (A,B, s,KAB)’
‘A sent (tA, tB) to B’NB = DSKA(c)
µ = MACNB (tA, tB , B)
s, µ−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check µ = MACNB (tA, tB , B);
if not then abort.
‘B rec. (tA, tB) from A’
‘Established (B,A, s,KBA)’
Protocol 8. Optimized Diffie-Hellman protocol in the UM (messages combined)
6 Conclusion
The Canetti-Krawczyk proof model is very attractive due to its modular nature. It enables an engineering
approach to the provable security of protocols, by separating the proofs of authentication mechanisms from
the proofs of protocols providing the basic required functionality such as key exchange. This enables a wide
variety of proven secure protocols in the real world to be generated, by mixing and matching authentication
mechanisms with basic key exchange protocols, yet with only a minimal number of security proofs.
However, until now, this engineering approach meant that proven secure protocols in the real world were
often very inefficient in terms of the number of messages required and the number of values generated. Al-
though optimization of such protocols was proposed in the original CK-model specification, the optimization
process was not formally described or proven to preserve security. Only heuristic arguments were available
to justify the process.
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In this paper, the optimization process has been described, and theorems have been proven stating that the
various optimization steps are valid and preserve security. A summary of these optimization steps is provided
in Table 2. In addition, it has been proven that two or more authenticators may be used in conjunction with
one another whilst preserving security. This result greatly increases the number and variety of available real-
world protocols, and enables the use of different authentication mechanisms tailored to the needs of each
participating party. As a consequence of our results, a number of optimized protocols from earlier papers
[15,16,13,7] now have full security proofs.
Optimization Reason
Use of more than one authenticator with one AM pro-
tocol
Useful for protocols where capabilities of participants
are not symmetrical, and increases the number and va-
riety of possible secure protocols.
Omission of AM messages from the cleartext of mes-
sages generated by authenticators.
The message has often been sent elsewhere; this enables
removal of redundancy.
Moving nonces or encrypted nonces generated by au-
thenticators.
Enables the number of messages to be reduced by
piggy-backing messages.
Substitution of any value not previously used as a nonce
in that authenticator by the party for the nonce in most
authenticators.
Saves on the number of values generated by the protocol
and hence the message size.
Use of pre-existing protocol values for most nonces
(provided they were previously unused).
”
Allowing the protocol to begin before the session iden-
tifier has been defined.
”
Use of pre-existing protocol values to create the session
identifier.
”
Table 2 Summary of optimizations available
In the future, the number of basic proven secure components available in the CK-model is expected to
increase. When new components in the AM or HM are proposed, a template specifying:
– the requirements if actions are to be reordered
– any additional unauthentic messages that may be sent containing values from authentic messages
will enable users of the component to easily create a concrete version of the protocol suitable for an op-
timization that preserves emulation between the real and ideal worlds. Similarly, when new authenticators
are proposed, if the proposer indicates which parts of the authenticator may be omitted, which parts may
be moved to an earlier or later position, and which parts may be replaced with other values provided they
satisfy certain requirements, without invalidating the security proof, then users of these authenticators can
easily optimize real world protocols created using these authenticators.
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